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Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the Drug War
to Unconstitutional Limits?
PHILIPPA M. GUHRE*
The policy of this Administration is 'zero tolerance.' No amount of
drug use is acceptable. And, zero tolerance should be the policy of every
state in the Umon-of every county and town, of every school, business,
and community group-in fact, of every American.,
INTRODUCTION
Fighting drug abuse in America is a top government priority President
Bush recently proposed allocating $10.6 billion in federal funds 2 to wage
war against a .drug problem that reportedly costs the United States ip to
$100 billion a year.3 Additionally, in the past six years Congress has passed
four major bills that were specifically aimed at or included provisions for

battling the drug problem. 4 The intensity of this campaign is particularly

evident in the latest bill, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 5 In that Act,
Congress provided for eviction of public-housing tenants who are involved
with drugs, 6 denial of federal benefits such as loans, contracts and licenses
to convicted drug possessors, 7 and the establishment of a demonstration
program to drug test criminal defendants.'

* J.D./M.P.A. Candidate, 1992, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington;
B.A., 1982, Dartmouth College.
i. George Bush, Building a Better America, Supplement to the Message Delivered to the
Joint Session of the Congress 66 (Feb. 9, 1989).
2. Fessler, Bush's $10.6 Billion Strategy Targets Enforcement Again, CONG. Q., Jan. 27,
1990, at 242. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, proposed
an alternative plan for $14.7 billion m anti-drug expenditures. Spending for anti-drug activity
in 1989 surpassed $9.4 billion. Id.
3. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 5251(a)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1988).
4. Biskupic, Bush's Anti-Drug Campaign Emphasizes Enforcement, CONG. Q., Sept. 9,
1989, at 2314. The bills are: the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)); the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (102 Stat.) 2270-16 (a defense bill wluch included appropriations of $300 million for
drug interdiction activities); the $1.7 billion Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1988)); and the
Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (an anti-crime bill
that included several provisions directed at drug traffickers).
5. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)).
6. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 5101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(d)(1)(5) (1990).
7. Id. at § 5301, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
8. Id. at § 7304, 18 U.S.C. § 3154 note (1988).
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The federal government is not alone in the war against drugs. Local and

state governments across the country have taken such anti-drug measures
as confiscating Medicaid and food stamp cards from people arrested, but

not convicted, on drug charges; 9 arresting individuals who gather in groups
of two or more and "[fail] to move on";i ° and stopping cars that fit drugcourier profiles to perform warrantless searches."

Other more extreme

alternatives, such as one for public whipping, and another to restrict gang
members to their homes for all but five minutes a day, have also been
proposed. 12
Many Americans are deeply concerned about drugs and support aggressive

tactics. A recent poll of young professionals, for example, revealed that
26% of respondents were worried about serious drug use by someone close

to them.' 3 Additionally, a Washington Post/ABC News poll showed that
52% of those surveyed were willing to have their homes searched, 67%

were willing to have their cars stopped and searched without a warrant,
55% favored mandatory drug testing of all people and 67% favored drug

4
testing for all high school students.
In the face of such battle fever, there is always a danger that the
government may amass and unleash an arsenal that undermines constitu-

tionally protected rights such as the fourth amendment guarantee against

unreasonable searches and seizures.' 5 Indeed, just such claims finally brought
the Supreme Court into the fray In Skinner v Railway Labor Executives'
Association 6 and National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, ' the

Supreme Court upheld drug testing of railroad and customs employees
without warrants, probable cause or individualized suspicion.' 8 These decisions were particularly troubling because of the intrusiveness of the antidrug weapon at issue. 19 They also signified the Court's readiness to abandon
9. N.Y Times, Oct. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 1, B10, col. 2 (police activity in Lawrence,
Massachusetts).
10. Id. at Al, col. 2, B10, col. 2 (anti-loitering law in the District of Columbia).
11. Id. at B10, cols. 3-4 (police activity in Volusia County, Florida).
12. Id. at Al, cols. 1-2 (Whipping was proposed in the Delaware State Senate; restricting
gang members to their homes was proposed in Los Angeles.).
13. Eisenach, How to Win the War on Drugs: Target the Users, USA Today, Jan. 1989,
at 46, col. 1.
14. Wicker, Rights vs. Testing, N.Y Times, Nov. 28, 1989, at A25, col. 5.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV

16. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
17 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989).
18. Id. at 1397; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
19. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
("[T]he issue here is whether the Government's deployment in that [drug] war of a particularly
draconian weapon
comports with the Fourth Amendment."). Subpart D of the Federal
Railroad Administration regulations provides that if the normally specified unne and breath
tests are to be used in a disciplinary hearing, the employee must be allowed to provide a blood
sample as well. If the employee declines to provide a blood sample, the railroad may presume
impairment from a positive urine test. Id. at 1410. No one could seriously argue that a
procedure to withdraw bodily fluids with a needle is not intrusive.
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its, presumed role of dispassionate arbiter and to join the legislative and
executive branches in the crusade to eliminate the drug scourge.

One issue which the Supreme Court may have to consider before the
drug war is over is whether welfare benefits" can be demed because of a
recipient's drug use. Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to

hinge eligibility for some government benefits, including public housing, 2'
on drug involvement. In addition, two recent legislative proposals, one of
which would have required drug testing, have surfaced to condition or to

deny subsistence benefits in this fashion?2 Governmental attempts to reform

welfare by eliminating drug abuse may be well-intentioned23 given the costs

of public assistance programsu and the extent of the drug problem among
some segments of the poor.25 Yet, although welfare benefits have been

variously conditioned in the past, 26 conditiomng them on passing a drug
test is a new and vexing idea. Aside from raising moral and political issues,
any program to deny welfare benefits based on drug testing is certain to

encounter constitutional challenges.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court, despite its recent rulings in
Skinner and Von Raab, should not uphold a measure conditiomng welfare
benefits on passing a drug test. Part I briefly discusses rationales for welfare
and outlines the current state of the law regarding welfare benefits and

drug use. Part II analyzes the recent Supreme Court rulings on drug testing

20. The-term "welfare" is most closely identified with the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") program. For an informative discussion of the AFDC program and how
it came to be known as "welfare," see generally Cotter, Twenty Years of Welfare Reform:
An Insider's View, in REFoRMNG WELFiA: LESSONS, Lnms, AND CuoicEs 15 (R. Coughlin
ed. 1989) [hereinafter REFORMVG WELFARE]; and S. LamrAN, PROGRAMS iN Am OF sTIa POOR
31-39 (1985). In common parlance, other general subsistence benefits are often referred to as
welfare. For ease of discussion and unless otherwise indicated, the term "welfare" is used in
tis analysis to encompass AFDC as well as other general assistance programs.
21. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 5101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(d)(1)(5) (1990).
22. See H.R. 1720, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 809 (1987); H.R. 1303, Reg. Sess., La. (1989).
The latter bill was proposed by Louisiana State Representative David Duke.
23. Both proposals purported to aid welfare reform by eliminating drug use and thereby
reducing welfare dependency. See H.R. REi. No. 159, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 37
(1987) (House Committee on Ways and Means report discussing the purpose of the Family
Welfare Reform Act); H.R. 1303, Reg. Sess., La. (1989).
24. Federal AFDC expenditures alone totaled $16.8 billion in federal and state money in
1988. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 'OF TE U.S.

368 (Table No. 610) (1990) [hereinafter

STATISTcAL ABSTRACT].

25. B. Frank & W Hopkins, Current Drug Use Trends in New York City, New York
State Division of Substance Abuse Services, Bureau of Research and Evaluation 2 (Dec. 1988)
(copy of unpublished report on file with the Indiana Law Journal); Adler, Hour by Hour
Crack, NEwSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 64.
The author recognizes that chronic drug use afflicts all socio-econormc classes, not just
economically disadvantaged groups.
26. See, e.g., Dandndge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a ceiling on the total
dollar amounts of AFDC grants per family); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(upholding the validity of a statute denying welfare benefits to state residents of less than a
year).
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and discusses their implications if the issue arises in a welfare benefits case.

Part III explores the kinds of constitutional arguments available to a welfare
recipient challenging a drug testing law This Note concludes that conditiomng subsistence benefits on drug testing would be inexpedient, and may
be unconstitutional.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Welfare

Poverty and aid to the poor are not modem phenomena. The Old
Testament proclaimed, "For the poor shall never cease out of the land:
therefore
thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother." 27 The
idea of the federal government acting as chief benefactor, however, is a

comparatively recent concept. Prior to the New Deal, local and state
governments and private organizations took care of society's needy. The
Social Security Act of 1935 began the shift toward federally funded poverty
programs that yielded the modern welfare system. 28 Today Americans accept,

and from all indications support, most social programs offered by the
federal government.29

Although there now may be broad non-partisan support for both state
and federal aid to the poor, there is not agreement as to the design or the
extent of government poverty programs. Hence, welfare reform is continually on the public agenda, with proposals offered to achieve goals ranging

30
from helping the destitute achieve self-sufficiency to reducing welfare costs.
There are jurisprudential as well as practical underpinnings to these

persistent calls for welfare reform. At odds with the belief that "a good

society should help the needy, and that the government should have sound
poverty programs" 31 is the idea that subsistence benefits, typically defined

as basic elements of survival like food, housing and medical assistance, are

27. Deuteronomy 15:11 (King James).
28. See WIT CHARITY FOR ALL (M. Ierley ed. 1984) (tracing the history of aid to the
poor from ancient times to the present); Cotter, supra note 20, at 15.
29. See Harpham & Scotch, Ideology and Welfare Reform in the 1980's, in REoamQIo
WELFARE, supra note 20, at 54; Moon, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHs, ANt WELFARE,
at 1-2, 13 (J.D. Moon ed. 1988). The various authors m Responsibility, Rights, and Welfare
posit that the welfare state endures despite constant criticism because it expresses our "deepest
values," id. at 13, and convictions about addressing poverty and "social dislocation." Id. at
1.
30. See WELFARE REFORM, CONSENSUS OR CONFLCT? xv-xvii (J.S. Denton ed. 1988);
National Governors' Association, Policy on Welfare Reform, in REFORMIo WELFARE, supra
note 20, at 201.
31. Novak, On Social Intervention: Some Reflections on the Relationship Between Family
and Poverty, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 61, 63.
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not constitutionally required. 3 2 Legislators merely choose to make welfare
available to eligible recipients out of moral compunction and could legally
vote subsistence benefits out of existence. This absence of a constitutional
grounding leaves welfare in legal limbo. Consequently, the debate over,
whether there should be a judicially protected "right" to welfare rages,
with each side boasting eminent scholars.3 3 The controversy is important
because if there is no right to welfare, "[t]here is no legal cause of action
34
for the want of benevolence."
Since there is no clear constitutional provision on which to ground a right
to welfare, it is theoretically a government benefit that can be conditioned
or rescinded. Although rescission of welfare altogether seems unlikely,
conditioning eligibility on drug testing is a plausible next step in the drug
war. A look at the current state of legislation in this area demonstrates
how close we are to taking that step.
B.

Existing Laws and Recent Proposals to Condition Welfare
Benefits Based on Drug Use

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19881- sets the stage for Congress' conditioning government benefits on drug testing. The stated purpose of the Act
is "to prevent the manufactunng, distribution, and use of illegal drugs
...
"36 The Act approaches the task from several angles, including establishing the Office of National Drug Control Policy3 7 and setting guidelines
for drug education, treatment, prevention and law enforcement. Title V of
the Act lists Congress' findings about drug use in the United States. One
section states, for example, that 23 million Americans and over 25 percent
of all high school semors use illicit drugs at least monthly, and that 10-to15 percent of all highway fatalities involve drug use.38 These statistics lay
the foundation for the concluding section: "It is the declared policy of the
United States Government to create a Drug-Free America by 1995."1 9

32. Epstein, The Uncertain Questfor Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV 201; Michelman,
Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
33. For arguments in favor of welfare rights, see Michelman, supra note 32; and Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For arguments against welfare rights, see Bork,
The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; and
Epstein, supra note 32. For a thorough analysis of the philosophical theory behind welfare
rights, see C. WELLMAN, WELFARE RiGHTs (1982).
34. Epstein, supra note 32, at 204.
35. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

U.S.C. (1988)).
36. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 preamble, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified

as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)).
37. Id. at § 1002, 21 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (1988). William Bennett was the first Director of
National Drug Control Policy.

38. Id. at § 5251(a), 21 U.S.C. §.1502 note (1988).
39. Id. at § 5251(b), 21 U.S.C. § 1502 note.
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Immediately following the declared drug-free policy, the Act denies federal
benefits to convicted drug possessors for up to one year, first-time drug
traffickers for up to five years and third-time traffickers permanently.Section 5301(d) defines deniable benefits as including grants, contracts,
loans and professional or commercial licenses, but excluding welfare and
4
public housing. '

Section 5101,42 however, provides that a public housing tenant may be
evicted if the tenant, a member of the tenant's family, or a guest or other
person under the tenant's control is involved in "drug-related cnminal
activity. ' 43 This provision illuminates a puzzling inconsistency in Title V
Section 5101 permits eviction from public housing for simply being involved
with drugs, even if the individuals have not been arrested or convicted on
any drug-related charges. 44 However, section 5301, which denies other federal
benefits, only applies to convicted drug offenders, and will not permit denial
of public housing.45 Logic dictates that convicted drug offenders be denied
public housing before individuals who have not been convicted. Congressional lawmakers, however, apparently saw things in a different way This
incongruity leaves open the possibility that welfare benefits might also be
denied to individuals who are involved with drugs but have not been
convicted.
In fact, two approaches, the carrot and the stick, have been used in past
unsuccessful attempts to condition welfare benefits based on drug use. In
1987 the House of Representatives approved its Family Welfare Reform
Act. 46 Section 809 of the Act provided for the demal of benefits to any
welfare recipient who had withdrawn from a treatment program before its
completion. The recipient could become eligible for benefits again upon
reentering treatment, or upon a "medical determination" that he or she
was drug free. 47 The section was dropped in the joint committee before

40. Id. at § 5301(a)-(b), 21 U.S.C. § 853a (1988).
41. Id. at § 5301(d), 21 U.S.C. § 853a.
42. Id. at § 5101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(d)(1)(5) (1990).
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at § 5301, 21 U.S.C. § 853a.
46. H.R. 1720, 100th Cong., ist Sess. (1987).
47. Id. at § 809. Although § 809 did not call explicitly for drug testing, its requirement of
a "medical deterrmnation" that the recipient is drug free before restonng benefits certainly
implicates drug testing. Ironically, if this section had passed, it almost assuredly would have
driven welfare recipients away from drug treatment. Treatment programs are notoriously
difficult and have extremely high dropout rates. See Isikoff, Relapse Rates Undermine Enthusiasm for Traditional Drug Treatment, Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1990, at A6, col. 1;
Interview with Chris Pelicano, Public Affairs Director for Phoenix House Drug Treatment
Center, in New York City (Aug. 11, 1989) (citing dropout rates of 40%, usually within the
first 90 days). Drug addicts at risk of losing their benefits if they drop out of a rehabilitative
program will not enter the program in the first place.
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passage by the Senate of the revised Family Support Act of 1988.48 However,
that the House passed the proposal indicates that there is considerable
support among legislators for tying welfare eligibility to drug use.
The Louisiana legislature contemplated a more punitive approach. Proposed Louisiana House Bill 130349 identified the government interests at
stake as: "promoting the safety and welfare of children and adults,"
ensuring that "a major portion of the state's population" is "free of the
physical and mental impairments associated with drug dependence" and

"providing safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation of entitlement

benefits." 5 0 The bill provided that all adults in public assistance programs

be tested for drugs, and that individuals with positive test results be
suspended from benefits programs until they completed education and

rehabilitation programs and passed follow-up drug tests.5' The bill was not
passed by the Louisiana legislature; nevertheless, it offers further evidence
that public servants are actively seeking ways to both curb drug use among
welfare recipients and reduce welfare costs.

One difficulty with these proposals is that the solutions advanced may
not remedy the problems. First, denying welfare to drug users will only

eliminate that class of substance abusers from the welfare rolls; it will not
elimnate drug use and crime among the destitute. It seems senseless to

make poor drug addicts suddenly poorer and, therefore, more desperate to
commit income-generating crines.5 2 Instead, policy-rnakers should couple
the threat of denial of welfare benefits with immediate access5 3 to drug
treatment, otherwise they will create a truly wretched underclass.
Second, although legislators could deny welfare benefits based on drug
use without employing testing, drug testing is the most accurate and evenhanded means of assuring that a recipient is actually using drugs. 54 The

48. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
49. H.R. 1303, Reg. Sess., La. (1989).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Though this is a controversial assertion, there is data showing that drug abusers commit
crimes to support their addictions. See Chambers, Narcotic Addiction and Crime: An Empirical
Review, in DRuos AND THE CRiINAL JusTicE SYsTEM 125.42 (J. Inciardi & C. Chambers eds.
1974); Gould, Crime and the Addict: Beyond Common Sense, in id. at 57-73; Weissman,
Understanding the Drugs and Crime Connection, in CRuuNAL JusncE AND DRUGs 55, 72 (J.
Weissman & R. DuPont eds. 1982); Marriott, Addicts Awaiting Treatment Often Face Delays
and Panic, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
53. The Louisiana bill did provide that recipients who tested positive be enrolled in
counseling and rehabilitation programs. Unfortunately, the number of available drug-treatment
slots in most areas of the country is woefully inadequate. See Marriott, supra note 52, at Al,
col. 5; Telephone interview with John Sheehan, Director of Substance Abuse Treatment at
Covenant House, in New York City (Aug. 2, 1989).
54. The accuracy of drug tests is questionable. There are several factors to consider in
evaluating tests, including the testing method used, where and by whom the tests are done,
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Supreme Court acknowledged in both Skinner5 and Von Raab56 that visually

detecting impairment can be extremely difficult even for a physician,
especially when an alleged user is seen infrequently

5

7

Without drug testing,

the government would have a more difficult burden of proof in admimstrative hearings.
Third, although reliance on positive drug tests might promise to streamline
procedural hearings, claims of administrative efficiency would be misleading.
The potentially huge number of affected recipients59 and the possibility of

testing errors 6° might actually increase appeals and litigation.
The admims6
trative costs could create an organizational nightmare. '

Thus, while ridding the welfare population of drug use is a worthy goal,
the need to rely on testing may be problematic. The Supreme Court has

only delivered two opinions on drug testing, and both cases concerned
specialized classes of individuals. 62 Analysis of these cases is a prerequisite
to predicting how the Supreme Court might react to a program for drug
testing welfare recipients.

the chain of custody of the specimen, the inherent methodological unreliability and whether
or not initial test results are confirmed. See Employment Testing: A National Report on
Polygraph, Drug, AIDS, and Genetic Testing (UPA), at D:9-11 (1987) [hereinafter Employment
Testing]. Makers of commercially marketed immunoassay tests, the most commonly used types
of tests in mass drug testing programs, boast accuracy rates of 97-99%. However, scientific
studies have reported immunoassay false positive rates as high as 37% for certain classes of
drugs. Id. at D:9 (citing Holzman, Promising Drug Test Balances Rights, Insight, June 9,
1986, at 50, cols. 1-2). Data on laboratory accuracy rates are also conflicting. A 1985 report
in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that laboratories with government
contracts were wrong up to 100% of the time when testing unne specimens; however, the
Navy claims that it did not have one false positive m the first three years of its testing
program. Id. at D:10. Other studies have reported a general laboratory error rate of between
3% and 20%. Id. Whatever the real error rates, even a 1% error rate means that 1% of
welfare recipients, approximately 109,000 people, might be improperly demed benefits. See
STATisricAL ABSTRACT, supra note 24 at 368 (Table No. 610) (reporting 10.9 million AFDC
recipients in 1988).
55. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
56. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
57 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419.
58. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
59. In 1988, for example, there were 10.9 million federal AFDC recipients who would have

needed to have been tested.

STATiSTicAL ABSTRACT,

supra note 24, at 368 (Table No. 610). It

is impossible to tell how many of these might have tested positive for drugs.
60. See supra note 54.
61. The costs of the tests alone range from a few dollars per test for immunoassays to
$30 to $75 per test for the more sophisticated gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy method.
Employment Testing, supra note 54, at D:8-9. Cost has already figured in some debates over
drug testing. President Bush requested that states initiate drug testing programs in their cnmmal
justice systems in order to receive federal criminal justice funds, but Congress has not acted
on the proposal, largely because states have balked at the costs of such programs. See Fessler,
supra note 2, at 243.
62. Skinner concerned railroad employees involved in accidents or other safety incidents.
109 S. Ct. 1402. Von Raab dealt with U.S. Customs Service employees who were involved in
front line drug interdiction, carried weapons or handled classified material. 109 S. Ct. 1384.
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II.

DRUG TESTING: RECENT SUPREME COURT RUUINGS

The government's use of urine and blood testing as anti-drug weapons
has increased rapidly in recent years. The bulk of expansion occurred in
the employment arena, with the government using tests to reduce and deter
63
drug use among government workers. Despite their apparent success,6
drug testing programs have not gone unchallenged. Lower federal courts
have decided a number of cases in the last few years challenging both
private and public employers' programs, 65 but none reached the Supreme
Court until March of 1989. The compamon cases of Skinner66 and Von
Raab67 afforded the Court its first opportunity to comment on the issue of
drug testing. Although they focus on federal employee testing programs,
Skinner and Von Raab indicate how the Supreme Court rmght approach
drug testing programs in the welfare context.
In Skinner, the Court considered Federal Railroad Adminimstration (FRA)
regulations mandating that railroads test employees involved in certain
accidents, 6 and authorizing testing of employees in other specified circumstances. 69 The regulations required toxicological testing of blood, urine and
breath. A majority of the Court demed respondents' claims for an injunction
and held that the regulations did not violate the fourth amendment ban
70
against unreasonable searches.
The Court first decided that the fourth amendment applied because the
government endorsement and participation was extensive enough to make
any private actor who complied with the FRA regulations an agent or
instrument of the government. 71 The Court then found that blood and
breath tests clearly constituted searches. 72 Urine tests, although lacking the

63. See Employment Testing, supra note 54, at D:I.
64. For example, the Navy claims that its drug testing program reduced drug abuse among
personnel under age 25 from 47% in 1981 to 10% in 1984. Id. Private industry testing programs
have claimed similar results. Id.
65. See, e.g., 2 Empl. Testing Biweekly Rep. (UPA) No. 17, at BWR:291, BWR:294 (Oct.
15, 1988) (citing 16 cases); 3 EmpI. Testing Biweekly Rep. (UPA) No. 5, at BWR:361-62 (Apr.
15, 1989) (citing 10 cases).
66. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
67. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
68. The mandatory testing provision, subpart C, applies to employees involved in "major
train accidents," wluch are defined as accidents involving either a fatality, the release of
hazardous material accompamed by an evacuation or reportable injury, or damage to railroad
property of at least $500,000. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1989); see Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1408-09.
69. The permussive testing provision, subpart D, is applicable after a reportable accident
or incident (when a supervisor has reasonable suspicion that an employee was at fault) or
after a violation of certain safety rules. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(2)-(b)(3) (1989); see Skinner,
109 S. Ct. at 1409-10.
70. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
71. Id. at 1411.
72. Id. at 1412-13.
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invasiveness of surgical procedures, nevertheless were also- deemed searches
that intruded sufficiently upon reasonable societal expectations of privacy 73
Second, the Court looked at the reasonableness of the search. To assess
this factor, the Court balanced the infringement of the fourth amendment
right against the promoted government interest and held that the intrusion
on the employees' privacy was outweighed by the importance of the government interest in ensuring railroad safety 74 The majority then dispensed
with the usual fourth amendment requirements of warrant, probable cause
and reasonable suspicion in a rather bold departure from established fourth
amendment doctnne. 75 The requirement of a warrant has been frequently
76
waived where the intrusion was narrowly limited in its objective and scope,
and where 'the burden of obtaimng a warrant [was] likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search.' 77 Such circumstances, called
"special needs," '78 were deemed present in Skinner, and therefore, no warrant
was necessary 79
More surprising is the abrogation of a probable cause or reasonable
suspicion requirement, since individualized suspicion has generally been held
necessary even when a warrant was not. 0 To circumvent the probable cause
requirement, the Court noted that employees regularly undergo the routine
kinds of tests in question as part of physical exams, and that moreover,
they are participants in a pervasively regulated industry. According to the
Court, these factors combine to diminish the employees' expectations of
privacy, especially where the concern is for industry safety. 8' The Court
then relied on the FRA's argument that an employee's drug impairment
may not be otherwise detectable, and therefore, a drug test rmght afford
the only effective method of discovering drug use. 2 Justice Kennedy wrote
for the majority- "Though some of the privacy interests implicated
reasonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts
[elmployees

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

77

Id. at 1416 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533

1413.
1421.
1422.
1415.

(1967) (citation omitted)).
78. Id. at 1414. For a discussion of the evolution of "special needs" exceptions, see id.
at 1424-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1416.
80. Id. at 1416-17
81. Id. at 1417-18. The Court has used a "pervasively regulated industry" exception to
the warrant requirement in the past to uphold administrative inspection schemes. See Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (warrantless mine inspections, under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 held reasonable under the fourth amendment because of "the
pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation"). See generally R. PrmRCE, S. SHi.mo
& P Vmucun., ADmNisTRATTE LAW AND PROCESS § 8.2.5 (1985) (discussing administrative
inspections and the line of Supreme Court cases culminating in Dewey).
82. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419.
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subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to
others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." 3
Von Raab, the compamon case to Skinner, also upheld the constitutionality of a government employee drug testing program. Von Raab involved
a United States Customs Service program to perform unnalysis tests on
agents who were either directly involved in drug interdiction or the enforcement of related laws, required to carry firearms or required to handle
classified material.," The Court again deemed the prescribed unnalysis a
search, and applied the "special needs" exception permitting waiver of the
warrant, probable cause or individualized suspicion requirements.8 5
While the opimons are outwardly similar in approach and outcome, there
are distinct differences that make it difficult to predict accurately how the
Supreme Court will analyze other drug testing schemes. Skinner appeared
to apply only to employees who "can cause great human loss," that is,
workers on whom large numbers of human lives might depend.8 6 It is easy
to imagine the kind of harm that an out-of-control train nught cause, and
Skinner seems to limit itself to this or similar circumstances.17 Von Raab,
on the other hand, adds to the pool of employees for whom drug testing
is justifiable those employees who are involved in drug interdiction, carry
firearms or handle classified information. The latter two categories of
employees in particular lend themselves to increasingly broad interpretation.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent:
Logically, of course, if those who carry guns can be treated in this
fashion, so can all others whose work, if performed under the influence
of drugs, may endanger others-automobile drivers, operators of other
potentially dangerous equipment, construction workers, school crossing
guards.... [T]oday's holding apparently approves drug testing for all
federal employees with security clearances-or, indeed, for all federal
employees with valuable confidential information to impart."
In addition, the holding in Skinner was based, at least in part, on the
fact that the FRA produced extensive data linking drug and alcohol use to

83. Id.
84. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
85. Id. at 1397.
86. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419.
87. See id. Skinner also specifically mentions "persons who have routine access to dangerous
nuclear power facilities" as being appropriately susceptible to drug testing. Id. Presumably
Skinner would apply to any other kinds of employees whose impairment might endanger

multiple lives.

88. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority did not actually
uphold the Customs Service's provision allowing testing of employees who handle "sensitive"
information. Instead, the majority remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to further
clarify the category's scope. Still, the Court held that when this group of employees is more
clearly delineated, testing is permissible. See id. at 1397.
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The claim that the FRA testing scheme addressed

a real menace to public safety was, therefore, demonstrable. In Von Raab,
however, evidence of drug use among Customs Service employees or of

harmful incidents resulting from employee drug use was scant. 90 In fact,

the Commissioner of Customs stated that the program was designed to deter

possible future drug use, not to curb an already identified problem. 91 Thus,
the nexus between drug use among those tested and serious harm to society,
the foundation on which the Skinner holding rested, was purely hypothetical
in Von Raab. The compelling governmental interest identified by the Court
in Von Raab was not ridding the United States Customs Service of drug

users who had caused serious problems in the past, but rather, "preventing
the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the

integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry

"92

Von Raab

requires neither proof of any existing drug problem nor evidence that drugs

are even likely to cause the harm a testing program is designed to prevent.
Rather, the Court assumes that a drug problem exists93 and seems only to

need a showing that the drug testing program is instituted to avoid some
94
serious harm that could be conceivably drug-related.

89. The Skinner opinion begins with a discussion of the proven incidence of alcohol and
drug abuse among railroad employees involved in serious accidents. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1407-08. In addition, at least one Justice, Scalia, admitted that he joined the Skinner majority
because of the FRA data linking substance abuse to train accidents. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394. The majority admitted that only five of 3,600
Customs' employees tested positive for drugs. Id. The Von Raab dissent also mentioned this
paucity of data and the nonexistent connection between drug use and harm. See id. at 13991400 (Scalia, J;, dissenting) (emphasis in original) ("What is absent in the Government's
justifications-notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively
absent-is the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles
actually occurred
"). The majority answered this objection by comparing the Customs
Service testing program to suspicionless searches of passengers and carry-on luggage at airports,
where searches are justifiably undertaken to prevent possible harm. See d. at 1395 n.3.
91. Id. at 1387-88 ("The Commissioner stated his belief that 'Customs is largely drugfree,' but noted also that 'unfortunately no segment of society is immune from the threat of
illegal drug use."').
92. Id. at 1397
93. Id. at 1395 ("Petitioners do not dispute, nor can there be doubt, that drug abuse is
one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little reason to
believe that Amencan workplaces are immune from this pervasive social problem
").
94. This is not to belittle the government's concern about the dangers of drug use in the
U.S. Customs Service. In the dangerous, high stakes world of drug smuggling, drug impairment
could have devastating consequences. Some of the harms that the Customs Service hoped to
prevent by testing, such as fatal accidents and bribery of drug enforcement agents, had in fact
occurred; they were just not demonstrably drug-related. Id. at 1392. This was not a problem
for the majority, however, which spoke of the possibility of harm should targeted employees
be impaired by drugs. See d. at 1393.
The Court would probably also require some showing that the drug testing program attempted
to protect an employee's privacy as much as possible. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418
(discussing the fact that the FRA unne testing procedures did not require the presence of a
monitor and were performed in a medical environment).
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The third important difference between Skinner and Von Raab is the
number of dissenting Justices in each case. Seven Justices comprised the
majority m Skinner, while the Court split five to four in Von Raab.95 The
dissents in both cases criticized the majority's abandonment of the fourth
amendment requirements of probable cause, but in Von Raab the dissenters
also decried the lack of data on drug use and resulting harm. As Justice
Scalia wrote:
I joined the Court's opinion [in Skinner] because the demonstrated
frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees,
and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm,
rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline
to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency

of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely.9
That four of mine Justices were unable to justify drug testing in Von Raab
suggests that, absent overriding evidence of drug use and resulting serious
harm, the government may have trouble mustering a majority of the Court
to uphold some drug testing schemes in the future. However, the recent
resignation of Justice Brennan and the subsequent appointment of David
Souter could also cause the balance to tip the other way.
The implications of Skinner and Von Raab for a welfare recipient
challenging a drug testing statute are contradictory. On the one hand, the
Von Raab expansion of classes' appropriate for drug testing suggests that
the Supreme Court meant for the holding to be broadly interpreted. After
all, much of human behavior can be potentially harmful, particularly when
that behavior is affected by drugs, and the majority did not take issue with
Justice Scalia's characterization of the Von Raab holding's scope. If the
potential harms resulting from welfare recipient drug use-for example,
increased crime, danger to welfare children and chronic welfare dependency-can be powerfully portrayed, the Court might find the government
interest sufficiently compelling to justify drug testing.
On the other hand, the Court's assertion that employees in regulated
industries have a dimimshed expectation of privacy, and therefore, can
expect to be drug tested, hardly holds true in the welfare context. Welfare
recipients are not employees in a regulated industry and are entitled to the
same privacy expectations as all other private citizens. They differ from
their fellow Americans only in their receipt of government subsistence
benefits. Additionally, the dissent in Von Raab found the data on drug use
among customs employees and on the link to resulting harm wholly inadequate. This judgment suggests that the government would need to present
hard data on the extent of drug use among welfare recipients and the
95. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in Skinner. 109 S. Ct. at 1422. Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Scalia and Stevens dissented in Von Raab. 109 S. Ct. at 1398.
96. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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corresponding nexus between recipient drug use and grave harm to society

97
for some of the Justices, perhaps a majority of them, to be satisfied.
The initial message of Skinner and Von Raab is that, given a compelling
government interest, the Supreme Court is willing to uphold drug testing
of some government beneficiaries. The question, then, is whether the Court

would uphold drug testing of those who receive that government benefit

which most resembles charity-welfare. An analysis of the constitutional
claims available to a welfare recipient facing a drug testing statute will
suggest some possible outcomes.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AVAILABLE TO A WELFARE RECIPIENT
CHALLENGING A DRUG TESTING PROGRAM

A.

Equal Protection Claims

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that
the government shall not deny any person the equal protection of the laws.9"
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to require that even though

statutes must classify, they may not use classifications that do not serve the
statutory objective. 99 In addition, classifications that rationally serve a
statutory objective, but implicate a suspect or disfavored class of people,
will be presumed invalid unless the state can show an overriding governmental interest. A welfare recipient subject to a mandatory drug test might
have a defensible claim under this provision, if the petitioner framed her
challenge as one of unequal treatment of welfare recipients versus nonrecipients.1°°
97. Published data on drug use among welfare recipients is nonexistent. The National
Cleannghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information's four data bases turned up nothing on the
subject. Phone conversation with the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, Office of Substance Abuse Prevention, Oct. 9, 1990. Additionally, the harm to society
stemming from any welfare recipient drug use is hard to quantify. The most striking harm
would be drug-related criminal activity. This activity would include both drug offenses (buying
or selling drugs) and non-drug offenses (crimes committed by drug users). However, criminal
justice experts cannot agree on whether there is a causal relationship between drug use and
crime. See Weissman, supra note 52, at 72 ("The lay public continues to support the notion
that drug use and crime are inextricably intertwined in a singular and permcious relationship.
That assessment is premature and perhaps incorrect
"); see also Gould, supra note 52,
at 57-58, 67 (discussing the relationship between drug use and cnme). Ultimately, data linking
drugs and crime to welfare recipients might be unnecessary. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps concrete evidence of the severity of a problem is unnecessary
when it is so well known that courts can almost take judicial notice of it
").
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. See L. TRIuE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1440 (1988).
100. The class of non-recipients would include people who receive government benefits that
are not technically welfare, for example, social security, disability and veterans benefits, as
well as people who do not qualify for government benefits at all. The recipient would have
to characterize a challenge in this fashion because a welfare drug testing statute would probably
require testing of all welfare recipients, thereby precluding a claim that some recipients were
treated differently from others.
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The level of scrutiny used by the Supreme Court virtually determines the
outcome of a case.' 0' The Court applies one of three different levels of

scrutiny in equal protection cases. The most exacting standard is strict
scrutiny, which is triggered when a petitioner belongs to a suspect class or
when a fundamental right is implicated. 02 Intermediate level scrutiny is
invoked in cases involving "quasi-suspect classes."' 0 3 The final, and most
lenient, standard is rational basis review, which requires only that a statutory

classification be rationally related to a legitimate goal."' 4 The Court has
traditionally employed the ratioiial basis standard of review in equal protection claims in welfare benefits cases. This most deferential approach
grants legislatures wide latitude in desigmng welfare laws and makes equal

protection claims very difficult for recipients to sustain.
The leading case on rational basis review in welfare benefits cases is
Dandridge v. Williams. 0 5 In Dandridge, the state of Maryland used a
"maximum grant regulation" to limit the amount of money any AFDC
family could receive. °6 The maximum grant method did not take family
size into account, with the result that larger families received less money
per child than smaller families. Large-family recipients sued Maryland under
the Social Security Act and the equal protection clause. In applying a
rational basis standard' °7 and finding against the AFDC families, the Supreme Court said, "We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation
is wise . . [b]ut the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-

101. This is so because the burden of proof shifts. In rational basis review, the Supreme
Court presumes that a government act is valid unless the claimant can prove otherwise. Under
a stnct scrutiny standard, however, the Court presumes the opposite, that the government act
is invalid unless the state can prove otherwise.
102. L. TRiNE, supra note 99, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (discussing stnct scrutiny). A suspect class
is one generally considered to be a minority. The Court has so far limited the classification
to racial and ancestral groups. Id. § 16-13, at 1465; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citing race, alienage and national origin as triggering
strict scrutiny).
The Court has declared only three rights to be fundamental and therefore deserving of strict
scrutiny. These rights are the right to interstate travel, the right to vote and the right to equal
litigation opportunities. See L. TrimE, supra note 99, § 16-33, at 1610 n.2. The fundamental
rights doctrine does not apply in the case of a welfare petitioner challenging a drug test.
103. L. TRrBE, supra note 99, § 16-3, at 1445 (discussing intermediate scrutiny); see also
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny not
invoked in a case challenging a statute permitting some school districts to charge user fees for
bus transportation). Intermediate review "has generally been applied only in cases that involved
discrimunatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." Id. Although the Court will only
admit to expressly applying intermediate scrutiny when gender and illegitimacy are involved,
some other cases purporting to apply rational basis review bear a remarkable similarity to the
intermediate scrutiny line of cases. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (a zomng ordinance
applied to a home for the mentally retarded struck down).
104. L. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 16-2, at 1439-40 (discussing rational basis review).
105. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
106. Id. at 473.
107. Id. at 485.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:579

guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating

limited public welfare funds

"1108

The Court has displayed some reluctance to apply this precedent in cases
where the challenged law threatened complete denial of benefits.109 Even in
Dandridge the Court admitted that it recognized the enormous difference
between welfare claims and the average economic regulation cases to which
the rational basis standard normally applied." 0 However, persuading the
Court to invoke intermediate scrutiny in a welfare case poses problems.
To qualify for the intermediate level of scrutiny, claimants must belong
to a disfavored class. The Court has articulated at least three factors which
qualify a class for disfavored status: (1) the group has suffered some
moderate discriminatory treatment and is politically powerless, (2) the
classification stereotypes in a fashion that inaccurately portrays the group's
abilities or (3) the group possesses a personal trait over which it has no
control."' So far the Court has limited intermediate scrutiny to cases
2
involving discrnimnatory classifications based on gender and illegitimacy."
Plyler v Doe"3 is one exception. In Plyler the Supreme Court explicitly
applied intermediate scrutiny to a case involving neither gender nor illegit4
imacy, but rather, denial of public education to children of illegal aliens."
The unique circumstances of the case led the Court to apply heightened
scrutiny because of the claimants' status as minor children of disadvantaged
illegal aliens and because of the importance of the interest in education." 5
Arguably, this combination of disfavored status, the well-being of welfare
children and the importance of the threatened interest could trigger heightened scrutiny in a case where welfare benefits are denied based on drug
testing.

108. Id. at 487
109. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (food stamps);
United States Dep't of Agnc. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); New Jersey
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (public assistance). In each case the Court
applied the rational basis standard to laws that terminated benefits entirely and found the
statutes irrational and unconstitutional. Additionally, the Court has admitted that whether or
not there is complete deprivation of benefits is a factor to consider. See San Antomo Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1972). In Rodriquez, the Court noted:
The individuals
who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior
cases
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of
that benefit.
[A]ppellees [have not]
addressed the fact that
lack of personal
resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit.
Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.
L. TRiNE, supra note 99, § 16-33, at 1613-15.
See supra note 103.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 222-24.
Id. at 223.
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First, Plyler found that aliens in general, while not constituting a "suspect
class," belonged to an underclass created by the government's failure to
bar alien entry into the country 116 The Court then deterrmned that the
children of such aliens were innocent victims and should not be punished
for the illegal behavior of their parents. 117 If a welfare recipient facing a
drug test characterized the situation not as a question of one welfare recipient
compared to another recipient, as in Dandridge, but as a question of
unequal treatment of a welfare recipient compared to a non-recipient, the
petitioner could make a similar argument for heightened scrutiny
The petitioner could argue that the government is imperrmssibly classifying
only people who are eligible for welfare as "testable," thereby subjecting
the poor to the indignities of a drug test and infringement of their constitutional rights"' while allowing the rich to avoid the intrusion altogether.
Recipients could not rely solely on the argument that they were members
of a disfavored underclass of poor people because the Supreme Court has
consistently held that poverty alone does not create a suspect class." 9
Nevertheless, recipients could use Plyler to argue that their economically
disadvantaged status, combined with other factors, requires a stricter level
of scrutiny. And at least AFDC recipients could contend that the primary
purpose of the welfare program is to help needy children 20 who should not
121
suffer for their parents' sins.
The Plyler Court also determined that although education was not a
fundamental right, its denial to the plaintiffs would "mark them for the

116. Id. at 218-19.
117. Id. at 220.
118. In this case, the rights arguably infringed are the fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and the right to privacy.
119. Past claimants have argued for stnct scrutiny in cases involving the underprivileged.
The Court has repeatedly declined to admit that poverty creates a suspect, or even a quasisuspect class. See, e.g., Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487 (emphasis added) ("We have previously
rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor should
on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny."); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) ("[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is
not a suspect classification.").
120. See, Cotter, supra note 20, at 15-16. The purpose of the AFDC program is obvious,
considering that only adults with children are eligible for benefits.
121. The claimants in Plyler were the children themselves, and the use of intermediate
scrutiny was based, in part, on the immutability of the claimants' status as minor children of
illegal aliens. The Court stated that the children's parents would not have had so strong a
case. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)) ("Their
'parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,' and presumably the
ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs
in these cases 'can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."'). The implications of this reasoning for recipients challenging a drug testing statute are unclear. Since
only the parents of AFDC children are likely to be tested under such a statute, only the
parents could claim direct injury. The parents would then have to argue that their children,
who are immutably innors, would bear the brunt of the denial.
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rest of their lives
and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation."'' This
language is remarkably similar to the language used by the Court in Goldberg
v. Kelly' 23 to justify extending due process protection to welfare beneficiaries. 124 Thus, a recipient facing denial could argue that the interest in
welfare is equally as important, if not more so, than the interest in education
in Plyler and, therefore, favors use of intermediate scrutiny Although the
Court has thus far refused to extend the Plyler holding beyond the .'unique
circumstances ...25 that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and
rationales, ' 1 26 a welfare drug testing scenario seems to present just the set
of circumstances that compels the Plyler approach.
The arguments in favor of some form of heightened scrutiny are potent.
Nevertheless, neither intermediate nor strict scrutiny can guarantee a petitioner a victory; the standards only make it harder for the government to
prove that its interest supercedes the interest of the recipient. 27 In the case
of a welfare statute prescribing drug testing, the combination of interests
in fiscal conservation, avoiding welfare fraud, 28 eliminating welfare dependency and curbing drug use and crime could conceivably be compelling
enough to justify the invasion of a recipient's fourth amendment rights,
regardless of the level of scrutiny applied.
Irrespective of the levels of scrutiny, the criterion of drug use as the basis
for denying subsistence benefits suggests another equal protection claim
available to a welfare recipient. The argument would run as follows: the
primary purpose of a welfare statute is to provide aid to the poor based
on need. Therefore, although a welfare statute may classify American
citizens as welfare-eligible or non-eligible based on need, it cannot base
those classifications on a criterion like drug use or addiction, which is

122. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
123. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
124. In Goldberg, the Court stated:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the
reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate
meamngfully in the life of the community.
Public assistance, then, is not
mere chanty, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
Id. at 265.
125. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurnng)).
126. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243 (Burger, J., dissenting)); see also Comment,
Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws That Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA.
L. Rav 1547 (1984) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny ought to be extended in appropriate
cases).
127. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
128. Welfare fraud in this context would be the use of welfare money to purchase illegal
drugs.
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unrelated to need.' 29 This line of reasoning would not depend on whether
the Court applied heightened scrutiny because it argues that even under the
lowest level of scrutiny, the statutory classification is not rationally related
to a legitimate goal.' 30
The Supreme Court has already addressed the issue of unconstitutional
treatment of drug addicts. In Robinson v. California,131 the Court struck
down a California statute which made it a crime for an individual to be
addicted to the use of narcotics. The Court wrote:
[W]e deal with a statute which makes the "status" of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in
history would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease....
[I]n the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
crimnal offense of such a disease would doubtless be umversally thought
to be an infliction of cruel and unusual pumshment. . .12
The criminal nature of the California statute in Robinson distinguishes it
from a welfare drug testing statute, and the sanction of ninety days in
prison probably influenced the Court. Justice Stewart wrote, "Even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold.' ' 33 Nevertheless, the concept of penalizing someone
in any fashion for having a disease was what really bothered the Court,
and the case of a welfare recipient denied benefits because of drug addiction
should engender similar distaste. After all, punishment can take a variety
of forms. An imprisoned addict would at least have had food, shelter and
clothing. A terminated welfare recipient would be deprived of the means to
survive.

This argument rests, however, on blurring the distinction between one
who is addicted to drugs and one who has committed the act of using
drugs. The statute in Robinson was invalidated because it pumshed people
for the status of being addicted. In Powell v. Texas, 3 4 however, the Supreme

129. Recipients could also allege that welfare drug testing statutes are racially motivated.
Numerous conversations have convinced me that there is a widespread and partially rmsguided
belief that most welfare recipients and drug addicts belong to minority groups. However,
statistics indicate otherwise. For example, 52% of AFDC recipients in 1980 were white. T.
JoB & C. Roomas, By TE FEW FOR THE F-w 24 (1985). While concrete evidence of improper
racial motivation may be hard to pin down, some evidence can be found. For example,
Louisiana State Representative David Duke, who proposed the Louisiana drug testing statute
for welfare recipients, is a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. Although Duke continues to.
deny that he is affiliated with the Klan, his legislative office in New Orleans, Lousiana is also
the headquarters for the National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP).
130. However, there is also a possible argument for intermediate scrutiny based on the
contention that drug addicts possess a personal trait over which they have no control. See
supra note Il1and accompanying text. The trait is the disease of addiction.
131. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
132. Id. at 666.
133. Id. at 667.
134. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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Court upheld a statute which criminalized public drunkenness. In denying
the applicability of Robinson, the Powell majority explained that Robinson
was limited explicitly to cases where "no conduct of any kind is involved,"
and did not apply when the state was attempting to punish conduct. 33 Thus
the claimant in Powell was permissibly punished for committing the act of
public intoxication. The fact that he was an alcoholic did not erase his
culpability for the punishable conduct.
In light of Powell, the success of the Robinson argument depends on
persuading the Court that this status versus conduct dichotomy is illconceived. Justice White's concurring opimon in Powell offers a roadmap:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistable compulsion to use narcotics,
I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a
compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction
under a different name.,
Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, the
use of
narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the crimnal
3
law.1 6

If the Justices were to be convinced by this argument, then ultimately,
the Court would have to decide if a welfare statute can constitutionally
discriminate on the basis of an acknowledged physical condition (drug
addiction involving active drug use) "which may be contracted innocently
or involuntarily ,,i37
B.

UnconstitutionalConditions Claims

One constitutional claim available to a recipient challenging a welfare
drug testing program is not tied to any single clause in the Constitution.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions states that, although the govermnent may withhold a benefit altogether, it may not grant the benefit on
the condition that the recipient waives an independent constitutional right.'
This theory, that the greater power to deny does not always include the
lesser power to condition, originated in cases of foreign corporations attempting to do business in the United States.13 9 In recent times, the doctrine

135. Id. at 542.
136. Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
137 Id. at 567 n.29; see also id. at 667 n.8 (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5,
18 (1925)) ("Thirty-seven years ago this Court recogmzed that persons addicted to narcotics
'are diseased and proper subjects for [medical]- treatment."').
138. For exhaustive treatments of the doctrine, see Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HAgv L. Rav. 5 (1988); Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HAgv L. REv 1415 (1989); and UnconstitutionalConditions Symposium, 26
SAN DsaGo L. REv 175 (1989). For a discussion of the doctnne's usefulness in the welfare
context, see O'Neil, UnconstitutionalConditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54
CALiF. L. Rav 443 (1966).
139. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); see
also O'Neil, supra note 138, at 456-57.
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has been invoked with little or no consistency in the context of personal
liberties. In some cases where an unconstitutional condition was alleged,
the Supreme Court concluded that the conditions did indeed improperly
14
infringe on constitutional guarantees like the rights to speech and religion. 0
In other equally plausible cases, however, the Court categorically rejected
141
the notion that any right was infringed.
The schizophrenic attitude of the Court towards unconstitutional conditions makes it a difficult doctrine on which to rely Yet the doctrine is
suited to the case of welfare recipients faced with choosing between a drug
test and their welfare benefits. The government proffers a benefit that is
not constitutionally required, conditioning the offer on recipients waiving
their right to be free from unreasonable searches by undergoing mandatory
drug tests. Because the government could not constitutionally force the
same recipients to submit to drug tests without a compelling reason if they
were not in line for the benefits, it cannot compel the recipients to submit
to tests merely because they are in line for the benefits.
There are several useful examples of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine at work in cases concerning public assistance claims. In Wyman v.
James, 42 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a statute requiring
a home visit for continuation of AFDC benefits imposed an unconstitutional
condition on a welfare recipient by compelling her to relinquish her fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches. The Court reasoned
that home visitation did not constitute a search, especially because the visit
was not "forced or compelled" and the recipient could withhold her
consent.141 The Court went on to argue that even if the home visit had
144
constituted a search, the intrusion was not unreasonable.
The Wyman holding simultaneously raises and lowers the hopes of a
welfare recipient challenging a drug testing prograi. It raises hopes because,
unlike the home visits in Wyman, drug tests have already been called
searches by the Supreme Court. 45 Thus, an unconstitutional conditions

140. See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (speech); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religion).
141. See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (ability of employees and
their families to qualify for federal aid while striking); Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (ability of the
poor to use federal aid to pay for abortions).
142. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
143. Id. at 317.
144. Id. at 318. Some of the legitimate government purposes that made the search reasonable
were: (1) assuring the protection of dependent welfare children, (2) seeing that public funds
were reaching the-intended recipients and were being properly used, (3) helping to attain federal
relief objectives, (4) assuring the beneficiary's pnvacy by getting information directly from the
recipient instead of using private records and (5) obtaining essential information not available
elsewhere. Id. at 318-22.
145. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
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challenge to drug testing should not be rejected on the grounds that the
admnistrative tool at issue did not fall within the scope of the fourth
amendment. It lowers hopes because the Court stated that the Wyman
claimant was not in any way coerced; rather, she was perfectly free to deny
permission for the visit. That choosing to forego the visit meant loss of her
benefits did not make the choice any less free. The Court could easily
recycle this argument in a drug testing case, saying that a welfare recipient
may opt to refuse a drug test, and that the resulting denial of benefits does
not restrict his or her freedom of choice. A drug test, however, is arguably
more intrusive than the home visit prescribed in Wyman, 146 and if so, could
make the choice between condition and denial of benefits more onerous. In
addition, the home visit in Wyman was directed only towards achieving the
purposes of a child-welfare program, while drug testing is aimed at a
separate social problem.
A more recent case, Lyng v. International Union, UA W,147 involved a
1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act. Lyng highlights several other
strands of unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence. The amendment provided that a household could not become eligible for food stamps if one
of its members was on strike, and that a household food stamp allotment
could not increase because a striking member's income declined. 148 Several
unions challenged the amendment, claiming that it unconstitutionally infringed on union members' first amendment rights to association and
expression.

149

In the right to association claim, the unions first argued that the statute
would prevent household members from dining together by encouraging
strikers to leave so that a household's food stamp allotment might increase.
The Supreme Court denied this claim on the basis that it was "'exceedingly
unlikely' that [the amendment would] 'prevent any group of persons from
dining together." ' 150 The Court determined that the statute would probably
have no effect at all. 5' The unions also claimed that the amendment
146. Compare Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412-13 with Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-22. The
circumstances in Skinner and Von Raab seem to offer an opportunity for an unconstitutional
conditions argument; however, the issue was never raised in those terms. Epstein maintains
that the doctrine does not really apply to drug testing in the employment context:
The use of drugs is related to performance on the job, and private firms
insist on similar conditions. The conditions imposed do not seek to constrain
private practices and relations of employees that are unrelated to their employment. Nor do these cases involve the hypothetical danger of the government
using taxpayer money generally to pay people to release their fourth amendment
rights in general.
Epstein, supra note 138, at 70.
147. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
148. Id. at 363 n.2.
149. Id.at 363.
150. Id.at 365 (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1988)).
151. Id.
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infringed on their members' rights to associate with each other in pursuit
of union goals. The Court rejected this contention for substantially the
same reasons, declaring that the statute did not prevent union members
from associating together. 5 2 Finally, the Court answered the right to expression claim by saying that the statute did not "coerce" any belief or
153
require support of any particular political activities or views.
The Court's reasoning in Lyng identifies several arguments that might
frustrate a welfare recipient's unconstitutional conditions challenge to a drug
testing scheme. First, the challenged government action does not "prevent"
or directly and substantially interfere with the exercise of the right. Certainly
the Court could argue that a drug test does not prevent a recipient from
remaining free from unreasonable searches; he or she may remain "unsearched" and simply relinquish the welfare payments. The recipient might
counter this claim by arguing that the strikers in Lyng were unable to
receive a government benefit if they did something that was optional, while
the welfare recipients would be unable to receive the government benefit
unless they did something that was mandatory When the issue is framed
in this fashion, the element of coercion in the latter case seems much more
profound; the restriction of choice is somehow more threatening. Nevertheless, the.usefulness of this comparison for a recipient depends entirely on
the Court's assumptions about the recipient's options and the seriousness
of the alleged infnngement. 54
Additionally, the Court might contend that since the welfare recipient
can refuse the drug test, the statute does not directly or substantially interfere
with the recipient's fourth amendment rights. This argument is flawed. The
Court in Lyng found that the rights to association and expression were not
significantly affected. In the case of drug testing, however, the Court has
already declared drug tests to be infringements on the fourth amendment
right; the question for the Court, then, is not whether a right has been
burdened, but instead, whether the government may bargain for this right
by dangling a very tempting carrot.
Perhaps rethinking this approach in terms of bargaining is most helpful.
The bargains in Lyng and Wyman arguably did not require the recipients
of the benefits to make wrenching choices; the infringement of the rights
they alleged were somehow bearable, not deeply intrusive. Therefore, perhaps the government's proposed bargains were acceptable-a fair price for

152. Id. at 366.
153. Id. at 369.
154. The recipient's reasoning, for example, presumes that a union member may freely
choose not to strike. The Court might disagree. In fact, the Justices might set up a different
comparison. If strikers refuse to work, they are denied food stamps; if welfare recipients
refuse to be drug tested, they are denied benefits. In either case, the potential recipient has
an option. And, of course, the ultimate and determinative assumption is that one option,
either crossing the picket line or undergoing a drug test, is more onerous than the other.
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a fair purchase. For a welfare recipient to undergo procurement and analysis

of his or her bodily fluids, however, is corporally intrusive. The government's offer may demand too high a price.

C.

Due Process Claims

Due process protects constitutionally recognized property and liberty
interests from unreasonable intrusion by the state. Over the years, the due
process doctrine has developed procedures to insure that invasions of private
interests are in fact legitimate. In the context of drug testing of welfare
recipients, a due process claim would not focus on the government's right
to test recipients or ultimately take their property, but rather, would arise
in a challenge to the denial process after testing had occurred.
At the least, a recipient would be entitled to rmmum procedural standards to substantiate that he or she was in fact involved with drugs and
otherwise fit the statutory criteria for denial. At the most, a claimant would

be entitled to extensive procedural protection. 15s If a statute conditioning
subsistence benefits upon drug use failed to provide certain procedures, a
due process claim might arise.

The Supreme Court would not approach such a claim tabula rasa. Since

the 1970 decision in Goldberg v Kelly,"16 the Court has employed a twostep test when analyzing procedural due process claims. The Court asks

first if there is a protected property or liberty interest implicated, and
second, if so, what process is due? 1

7

Doctrines that have developed to

inform the two inquiries can be slippery, but understanding them is essential
to analysis of what kinds of procedures are due drug-tested welfare recipients.
The first inquiry is whether there is a protected property interest. Onginally the Court made this determination in government benefits cases based

155. Generally, due process protection before deprivation of a property or liberty interest
has come to mean some form of hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)
("The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before
a person is finally deprived of his property interests."). Judge Friendly lists eleven elements
of a fair trial that judges commonly consider when deciding what procedures are warranted:
(1) an unbiased tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, (3)
an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right
to call witnesses, (5) the right to know the evidence against one, (6) the right to have the
decision based only on the evidence presented, (7) the right to counsel, (8) the making Df a
record, (9) a statement of reasons, (10) public attendance and (11) judicial review. See Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing,'" 123 U. PA. L. REv 1267, 1279-95 (1975). The Supreme Court has
determined that termination of welfare benefits requires a pre-termination hearing. See infra
notes 163-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
156. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157. The two-step analysis first used in Goldberg was not explicitly acknowledged as such
until 1972 in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due.").
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on a right-privilege distinction. The distinction was perhaps most succinctly
stated by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford.5 s In
denying the petition of a policeman fired for violating a regulation that
restricted officers' political involvement, Holmes said, "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no consitutional right
to be a policeman.'1 5 9 Holmes added that the petitioner "cannot complain,
as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered- him."' 160 Holmes
thus neatly divided the umverse of government benefits in halves, one half
being constitutionally protected rights and the other government-bestowed
privileges ineligible for procedural due process safeguards.
The right-privilege dichotomy was used repeatedly over the years to defeat
due process claims of imperrmssible government encroachment upon private
interests.' 6' By the early 1970s, however, the Supreme Court had largely
abandoned the distinction in favor of a new "entitlement" theory of
constitutionally protected interests.' 62 The roots of the entitlement theory
can be found in Goldberg,6 a case generally regarded as the apex in the
Supreme Court's expansion of due process protection of government "privileges." Goldberg held that welfare recipients were entitled to due process
protection, and should be given a hearing prior to termination of benefits.'64

Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, "[Welfare] benefits are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them...
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance

benefits are 'a privilege and not a right. ' "1 65 The Court, in fact, practically
assumed that welfare benefits were a protected property interest and that
the real issue was "what process is due?"'

66

158. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
159. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517
160. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 518.
161. One scholar shepardized McAuliffe and found more than 70 cases, 77% of which used
the right-privilege distinction to deny due process protection. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HA v L. Rv 1439, 1441 n.7 (1968).
162. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (footnote omitted) ("[Tihe
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges'
that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights."); see also id.
at 571 n.9 (discussing the history of the right/pnvilege dichotomy). Whether or not the Court
has actually abandoned the right-privilege distinction is a topic of some discussion. The
replacement doctrine of the "entitlement" theory has evolved into something quite similar to
the distinction. See Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in Constitutional
Law: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN. L. REv 69, 69 (1982). Smolla remarks on
"[t]he almost schizophrenic tendency of the Court to simultaneously disclaim the [rightprivilege] doctrine by name and resort to the concept in practice
" Id. at 70.
163. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
164. Id. at 270-71.
165. Id. at 262.
166. In an opinion spanning sixteen pages, Justice Brennan used only one of those pages
to decide whether welfare benefits qualified as property. Id. at 262 n.8 ("It may be realistic
today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity."'). The Goldberg
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The Court elaborated on the entitlement theory in Board of Regents v
Roth, 67 stating that property interests "are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 'independent source such as state law
"168 Iromcally, the entitlement theory
articulated in Goldberg to extend due process protection to a government
benefit was then used in Roth and subsequent cases to deny procedural due
process protection. 69 In fact, the Court took the theory to its logical
conclusion in Arnett v Kennedy, 70 where the Justices denied due process
protection, declaring that a substantive entitlement was actually defined by
its accompanying statutorily ordained procedures and that a claimant must
take the "bitter with the sweet.''7
The Arnett argument, however, was categorically rejected in Cleveland
Board of Education v Loudermill.7 2 Justice White wrote, "'Property'
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more
than can life or liberty The right to due process 'is conferred, not by
legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee . ''173
Loudermill remains the Court's most recent pronouncement on the entitlement issue. Although the entitlement theory began in Goldberg as a
liberating concept designed to expand due process protection, later cases

Court then decided that the required pre-termination procedures and hearing must include: (1)
timely and adequate notice specifying reasons for the termination, (2) an opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses and present arguments and evidence before the judge, (3) the right
to retain counsel, (4) a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied upon and
(5) an impartial decision-maker. Id. at 266-71.

167 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
168. Id. at 577.
169. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (a life inmate
refused a sentence commutation by a parole board was not entitled to a written statement of
the reasons for the decision); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (the transfer of unruly
prisoners from a minimum to a maximum security facility did not require a pre-transfer
heanng); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (a police officer was not entitled to a pretermination hearing); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (a civil service employee was
not entitled to a pre-termination trial-type hearing). The Court's reasons for curbing the "due
process explosion" occasioned by Goldberg and its progeny are hard to fathom. One commentator has suggested that the Court was exhibiting a new attitude of "judicial federalism,"
which favored shifting the responsibility for defining due process norms to other branches of
government. See Smolla, supra note 162, at 88-89. But cf. Vitek v..Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
(the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital infringed on a protected liberty interest);
Morrssey, 408 U.S. 471 (revoking parole deprived the petitioner of a liberty interest).
170. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
171. The Arnett holding came to be called "the bitter with the sweet" argument because
of Justice Rehnquist's assertion that, "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at
153-54.
172. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
173. Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167).
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like Roth have made it a double-edged sword. Nevertheless, Goldberg still
stands and welfare benefits should therefore still be defined as entitlements
triggering due process safeguards. 174
Assuming the Court decided that recipients have a property interest in
welfare, the second question remains-what process is due? The Court
crystalized its approach to this inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge,'t s a case
involving whether a recipient of Social Security disability benefit payments
was entitled to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. In denying the recipient's claim the Court stated:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens
176 that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews set out a calculus similar to the balancing test applied earlier in
Goldberg. The Goldberg Court reached the conclusion that a pre-termination

174. Although it is true that the Court has never declared subsistence benefits to be "property
rights" independent of their statutory foundation, Tribe maintains that Goldberg cannot be
properly explained except in terms of establishing some substantive right to welfare. L. TimE,
supra note 99, § 16-49, at 1644.
While the concept of statutory entitlement would seem logically to lead to due process
protection for applicants as well as recipients, this has not been definitively decided. The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of due process for general assistance applicants;
however, three Justices have exhibited unwillingness to deny applicants the due process that
recipients are afforded. In Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018 (1985), Justices
O'Connor, Brennan and Marshall dissented from a denial of certiorari in a case involving due
process for a general assistance applicant. The Justices wrote:
The conclusion of the [Maine] Supreme Judicial Court that an applicant for
general assistance does not have an interest protected by the Due Process Clause
is unsettling in its implication that less fortunate persons in our society may
arbitrarily be denied benefits that a State has granted as a matter of right.
One would think that where state law creates an entitlement to general assistance
based on certain substantive conditions, there similarly results a property interest
that warrants at least some procedural safeguards.
[T]he weight of authority
among lower courts is contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court.
Id. at 1021.
This issue would have to be addressed in the case of a welfare statute prescribing drug
testing. The problem is tangled. Would both recipients and applicants need to be tested? Do
applicants have an entitlement or property interest in general assistance, and are they then
entitled to the same, or less, due process protection than recipients? If both applicants and
recipients are tested, and if both are afforded due process, will the administrative burden be
unsupportable? And if applicants are denied the due process granted to recipients, will not
governments have an incentive to keep applicants off the welfare rolls for as long as possible
while they deterine eligibility, since once the individual begins receiving payments, a hearing
is required for termination? Justice Black argued tis latter point in his Goldberg dissent. See
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).
175. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
176. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
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hearing was required by weighing the recipient's interest in uninterrupted

receipt of benefits against the government's interest in procedural efficiency
and fiscal conservation.177 In doing so, the Court isolated welfare recipients

from other petitioners seeking due process and offered them greater constitutional protection because of the seriousness of their potential loss. As
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
Thus the crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in the case
of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government
employee
or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements
are ended-is that termination of aid
may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." 8
Since Goldberg remains good law, it is safe to assume that the recipient's

interest is still paramount and would usually outweigh government efficiency
concerns. Nevertheless, if the government interest were expanded to include
the politically popular goal of eliminating drug abuse and its attendant
misery from the welfare population, the Court might be persuaded to side

against the welfare recipients.
Ultimately, a legislature attempting to condition welfare eligibility on drug
use must keep Goldberg and Mathews in mind when drafting its statute.
The state should theoretically offer every element of a fair hearing 179 to a
threatened recipient to avoid as many termination errors as possible. Although this "cover all bases" approach might create an enormous administrative burden if a great number of affected recipients appealed termination
decisions, the importance of the property interest demands nothing less than

that the state prove its case. 80 However, Mathews requires the Court to
consider both the value of additional procedural safeguards and the resulting

177. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-65.
178. Id. at 264 (emphasis in onginal). Justice Black recognized the significance of this
judgment for future welfare claimants in his dissent when he argued that such a balancing test
would never permit the government interest to win. Id. at 278 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[A]s
the majority seems to feel, the issue is only one of weighing the government's pocketbook
against the actual survival of the recipient, and surely that balance must always tip in favor
of the individual.").
179. See supra note 155 for a list of the elements of a fair heanng.
180. The likelihood of a profusion of recipient suits is probably small. The Goldberg
majority acknowledged that most- benefits denials are not challenged. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
265. Other commentators agree that disadvantaged members of society often do not use
available procedures: See Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary
System, 11 HAuv C.R.-C.L. L. REv 48, 67-69 (1976) (discussing the national welfare
administration error rate of 37.9%, but a six-month appeals rate of only 2%); Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance
of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REv 772, 784-85 (1974) (citing the same statistics as Rubenstem, but adding that
in 1970 almost 50% of Social Security disability claims were rejected and only 11% requested
hearings, and that the 2% nationwide appeals rate for denied public assistance claims rises to
6% when only terminations and denials are considered.).
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fiscal and adrmmstrative burdens. Under this analysis, offering the full array
of procedural safeguards might seem unwarranted.
CONCLUSION

Few people would dispute that this country is experiencing a national
drug crisis, and probably fewer still would champion a relaxed approach to
solving the problem. The stakes are simply too high. The question, however,
is how fierce a war we should wage. There seems now to be a preliminary
answer. The President, Congress and the Supreme Court have all demonstrated their support for aggressive anti-drug tactics, and until the drug
problem abates, there is no reason to believe they will dimmsh their efforts.
If the drug war is truly an all-out campaign, then we can expect an
increase in the number of laws that prescribe drug testing. And since
legislators have already attempted to condition welfare benefits on drug use
and drug testing, welfare recipients are a likely target. While eradicating
drug abuse from the welfare population is a worthy goal, achieving it by
means of wholesale drug testing may exact an undesirable toll from society
Not only would we beget a caste of desperate, addicted individuals, but we
would also undermine, perhaps irretrievably, our common belief in the
inviolability of constitutional guarantees. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
will likely be left to determine the proper balance between the cost of drugs
to society and the price of encroaching on the rights of the citizenry

